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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
and Susan M. Clare**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although the 2010 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit had its share of controversial cases,' the court's
evidentiary rulings were few in number and moderate in scope. As it
has in recent years, the court relied heavily on unpublished decisions to
resolve cases without creating binding precedent; thus there were no
major alterations to the law of evidence requiring practitioners to run to
the nearest volume of the Federal Reporter. As explained in previous
iterations of this Survey, 2 the court cautions that its "[u]npublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent." As a result,
The court generally does not cite to its "unpublished" opinions
[although it] may cite to them where they are specifically relevant to
determine whether the predicates for res judicata, collateral estoppel,
or double jeopardy exist in the case, to ascertain the law of the case, or
to establish the procedural history or facts of the case.'
The court did, however, continue to refine its treatment of character
evidence, the Confrontation Clause,5 and the reliability prong of the

* Partner in the firm of King & Spalding LLP. The Citadel (B.S., 1989); University of
Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1992).
** Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP. The Georgia Institute of Technology
(B.S., 2002); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2006).
1. See, e.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (a child
pornography case that produced two concurrences and three separate dissents).
2. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit evidence law during the prior survey period, see
Marc T. Treadwell, Evidence, 2009 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1113
(2010).

3.

11TH Cm. R. 36-2.

4.
5.

FED. R. APP. P. 36, 11TH Cm. I.O.P. 7.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 three-part test for
admitting expert testimony. This Survey will provide a brief pr6cis on
these cases and illustrate the major evidentiary trends in the Eleventh
Circuit in 2010.
II.

ARTICLE IV RELEVANCY

Federal Rule of Evidence 4047 is the gatekeeping rule for character
evidence and evidence of "crimes, wrongs, or acts" other than the conduct
that gave rise to the instant litigation. Rule 404 is designed to ensure
that a jury's deliberations will be based only on the evidence presented
to it and not skewed by the good or bad character or prior conduct of a
party or a witness.' Thus, evidence of a person's character traits is
inadmissible to show that the person acted according to those traits in
the case at hand."o Similarly, "extrinsic act evidence"-evidence that a
party or witness acted wrongly or rightly on a previous occasion-is not
admissible to prove that the person acted the same way in a given
situation.n Despite these limits, Rule 404 has such significant
exceptions that much extrinsic evidence is admissible; for example,
evidence showing knowledge or motive is admissible for those purposes,
although not to show that a defendant acted in conformity with prior
behavior.12
The court continued to rely heavily on Rule 404(b) in its decisions but
frequently with only a brief recitation of the Rule's requirements. For
the most part, the court's approach to extrinsic evidence is settled, and
judges rarely take the time to explain the theoretical underpinnings of
Rule 404(b) within their decisions.
One set of circumstances that recurred in a number of cases before the
court in 2010 was the use of extrinsic evidence that is "inextricably

6.

509 U.S. 579 (1993).

7.

FED. R. EVID. 404.

8. Id. Rule 404(b) states the following:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial.
9. See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee's Note.
10. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
11. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
12. Id.
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intertwined" with a charged offense. Although Rule 404(b) does not
include an exception for outside evidence that is inextricably intertwined, this has long been an exception to the general rule of exclusion.
For example, in United States v. Ellisor,1 the court characterized
"inextricably intertwined" evidence as something of an emanation from
the listed exceptions in Rule 404(b), noting that such evidence "pertain [s]
to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the
. . . [if it] is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the
crime,
14

jury"
Intertwined evidence was the critical issue in United States v.
Lewis." The defendant, Lewis, was indicted for cocaine conspiracy and
attempted possession arising out of an undercover drug bust operation
in South Florida in 2007. A confidential informant contacted two of the
codefendants about selling two expensive automobiles in exchange for
drugs. One of the codefendants, Jeree Grey, testified about this sale and
Lewis's role in starting a cocaine distribution organization in 2006 with
Grey and another codefendant, Carlos Spratt. Grey testified that Lewis
would transport cocaine from Atlanta, Georgia, to Birmingham,
Alabama, where the cocaine would be divided between the three of them.
Grey also testified that he received a call from Spratt in late 2007
regarding the transaction at issue, and that Lewis later convinced him
to trade the vehicles.16
When Lewis argued that evidence of the cocaine conspiracy was
prejudicial and irrelevant to the charged offense, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida disagreed, and the
Eleventh Circuit held that there was no abuse of discretion in that
choice." The panel reitereated its prior holding that when a cooperati7?g witness testifies about previous uncharged drug offenses that are
inextricably intertwined with evidence of the charged offense, the
testimony is admissible as intrinsic evidence." In the present case,
Grey's testimony concerning his prior narcotics dealings with Lewis
provided context for the jury and explained why Lewis and Spratt
attempted to involve Grey in the current drug deal." Because the prior
trafficking conduct was "linked closely in time as well as circumstance

13.
14.
1985)).
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

522 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1269 (quoting United States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.
373 F. App'x 930 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
Id. at 932.
Id. at 931-32.
Id. at 932.
Id.
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to the instant offenses," there was no abuse of discretion in admitting
the conduct to provide the jury a full understanding of the charged
crime.20 Thus, Rule 404 is not applicable because intertwined evidence
is intrinsic and goes to the actual charged offense.2 1
In United States v. McNair,22 the court swiftly disposed of the
defendant's arguments that extrinsic evidence was improperly admitted,
offering a litany of Rule 404(b) exceptions.2 ' The defendant, McNair,
was one of several Jefferson County, Alabama, commissioners who took
bribes from contractors in exchange for securing highly lucrative sewagerepair contracts. 24 During the trials of the various commissioners, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
admitted evidence of the bribes taken by the other commissioners.25
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this evidence was
admissible under any one of the Rule 404(b) exceptions." First, the
court explained that evidence of the other bribes was inextricably
intertwined with the bribes taken in each individual case." Second,
even if the evidence was not intertwined, the evidence would be
admissible to show the intent of the conspirators because the contractors'
arguments that they gave money out of friendship or goodwill could be
rebutted by showing that they gave money to other commissioners as
well.28 Finally, the evidence of other bribes could show a common plan
or motive, yet another Rule 404(b) exception.2 9 With a brief statement
that there was no merit to the defendants' argument that the prejudice
of this extrinsic evidence outweighed its probative value, the court noted
that the district court had properly given limiting instructions for the
Rule 404(b) evidence, refuted each of defendants' contentions, and
concluded that there had been no abuse of discretion."0

20. Id.
21. See id.; see also United States v. Valere, 388 F. App'x 922, 927-28 (11th Cir. 2010)
(discussing inextricably intertwined evidence and Rule 404(b)); United States v. GarciaBarzaga, 361 F. App'x 109, 114 (11th Cir. 2010) (discussing inextricably intertwined
evidence and Rule 404(b)).
22. 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010).
23. Id. at 1203-06.
24. Id. at 1164-65.
25. Id. at 1203.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1203-04.
28. Id. at 1204.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1204-06 & n.72.
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In United States v. Park," a confidential informant testified about
his prior drug dealings with the defendant and his coconspirators. 32
The court recognized that evidence of crimes other than those charged
is generally not admissible under Rule 404(b)."3 Such evidence is
admissible, however, "if (1) [it] is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant's character, (2) the act is established by sufficient proof to
permit a jury to find the defendant committed the extrinsic act, and (3)
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by
its undue prejudice."'
The court observed that "Rule 404(b) does not apply where the
evidence concerns the context, motive, and set-up of the crime, or forms
an integral and natural account of the crime, or is necessary to complete
the story of the crime for the jury."3 ' The court stated, however, that
under Rule 403" "[siuch 'inextricably intertwined' evidence may be
excluded . . . if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice."3 ' Furthermore, "[tihe balance under Rule
403 should be struck in favor of admissibility.""
Next, the court determined that the Southern District of Florida did
not abuse its discretion by admitting the confidential informant's
testimony regarding their prior drug dealing because it gave context to
the crime and "was inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the
The district court properly admitted evidence of the
conspiracy.
defendant's subsequent cocaine possession because, by maintaining that
he had not conspired to possess cocaine with an intent to distribute, the
defendant placed his intent at issue.4 0 The fact that he later possessed
cocaine was relevant to his motive and intent in his interactions with his
coconspirators."
The probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test is critical
but not always dispositive of whether the district court abused its
discretion. Despite the potential for prejudice, the admission of extrinsic
evidence will not defeat a conviction when the evidence of guilt is

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

386 F. App'x 965 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 968.
Id.
Id.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Park, 386 F. App'x at 968.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 968-69.
Id. at 969.
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"overwhelming" or even merely "substantial."' This principle appears
43
Brenda Darling was
with clarity in United States v. Darling.
convicted of fraudulently endorsing and passing U.S. Treasury checks.
At trial, a number of Darling's former coworkers testified about her
questionable dealings, including passing checks to unauthorized people,
forced endorsements, and hurried, whispered conversations among the
coconspirators. Those very coconspirators testified against Darling,
corroborating much of the other evidence and explaining the nature of
their conspiracy."
On appeal, Darling argued that the Southern District of Florida had
erroneously admitted evidence showing that the bank had investigated
her and found irregularities in records of bank accounts belonging to her
family members. Although the Eleventh Circuit noted that it was not
certain whether this evidence was inextricably intertwined with the
evidence of fraud, the court relied on the oft-used "harmless error"
doctrine and concluded that the rest of the evidence amassed at trial was
more than enough to justify Darling's conviction." Given the substantial evidence of guilt presented at trial, the admission of extrinsic
evidence that was not inextricably intertwined or subject to another
404(b) exception was insufficient grounds for reversal.
III.

HEARSAY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The hearsay rule,4 its exceptions," and its interplay with the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendmento are some of the most
convoluted elements of evidence law. Though the rule is simple-out of
court statements are inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter
asserted 1 -there are seemingly endless permutations as to when and
how the rule applies. Given the relative brevity of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the twenty-three separate hearsay exceptions listed in Federal

42. See United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1254 n.31 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that
any error was harmless considering overwhelming evidence of guilt); United States v.
Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 914 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that when evidence of guilt is
substantial, error is harmless).
43. 396 F. App'x 607 (11th Cir. 2010).
44. Id. at 608-10.
45. Id. at 614.
46. Id. at 615.
47. See id.; see also Hubert, 138 F.3d at 914.
48. FED. R. EVID. 802.
49. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against him." Id.
51. See FED. R. EVID. 801-802.
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Rule of Evidence 803 are testament themselves to the importance of
controlling hearsay in federal courts. Furthermore, the scholarship on
the contentious debates surrounding the scope of the Confrontation
Clause are some indication of the stakes involved in admitting statements from any person who is not testifying live in the courtroom."
Put briefly, the Confrontation Clause guarantees criminal defendants
the opportunity to "confront" and question the witnesses brought forth
by the government." "Testimonial" hearsay evidence is barred unless
the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had a prior opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant." "Testimonial" statements are usually
"solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact."s" These statements can include
"material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that
the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." 6
Since the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Crawford
v. Washington" seven years ago, the Eleventh Circuit, understandably,
has had to grapple with a number of hearsay and Confrontation Clause
cases." Somewhat more surprisingly, the court has had to explain the
hearsay rule and its exceptions and exclusions. The year 2010 was no
exception-both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules received
substantial attention from the court. In fact, these cases were among
the most significant evidence rulings of the year.
In United States v. Green," Messiah Green contested his twenty-year
sentence for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during a crime
of violence. One critical part of the case against Green was the cell
phone tower location information derived from his phone and his cell
phone records on the day the robbery was committed. The Government

52. See, e.g., Todd E. Pettys, Counsel and Confrontation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 201 (2009)
(outlining the Supreme Court's fractious and changing approach to the Confrontation
Clause).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
54. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
55. Id. at 51.
56. Id.
57. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the Confrontation Clause and the right to cross-examination, particularly of the
government's "star" witness); United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1358-61, 1362 n.12
(11th Cir. 2006) (discussing the interplay between the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause, as well as the Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford).
59. No. 10-10300, 2010 WL 3401485 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 2010).
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presented the data supplied by Metro PCS, Green's cell phone carrier,
and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
denied Green's objection.6 0
On appeal, Green argued that the tower locations and the cell records
used against him violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
rights, asserting he had a right to cross-examine an employee of Metro
PCS at his trial." The Eleventh Circuit explained the testimonialevidence rule stated in Crawford and noted that the Supreme Court's
ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts62 expanded the testimonial
statement definition to include affidavits containing forensic analysis
results of seized substances." The Supreme Court had reasoned that
the sole purpose of these affidavits "was to provide prima facie evidence
of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance," and the circumstances under which the statements were made
would lead a reasonable witness to understand that the statements may
be used at a trial.'
When the Supreme Court dismissed the claim that such affidavits
were admissible as business records, the Court explained that because
business records are created by an entity for the administration of its
affairs rather than for proving or establishing facts at trial, the records
are typically not testimonial." Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit noted
it had previously held that for purposes of the Sixth Amendment, nontestimonial documents include those that are routinely prepared for
purposes other than a criminal trial.6 6
Applying this interpretation of Crawford, there was only one possible
outcome. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that Green's phone records
and tower location information were non-testimonial and, therefore,
admissible under Rule 803(6)67 as business records." In addition,
Metro PCS created the records for business administration purposes
rather than for proving a fact at trial; therefore, they were nontestimonal and Green's constitutional right was not violated when the
district court admitted the records into evidence." The decision in

60. Id. at *1.
61. Id.
62. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
63. Green, 2010 WL 3401485, at *1 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532).
64. Id. (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at *1-2 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539-40).
66. Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226-29 (11th Cir.
2010)).
67. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
68. Green, 2010 WL 3401485, at *2.
69. Id.
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Green demonstrates that, in light of Melendez-Diaz, criminal defendants
will face a higher burden of showing that many regularly prepared
documents are inadmissible or violative of the Confrontation Clause.7 0
The Eleventh Circuit also considered the Confrontation Clause and its
interplay with Rule 403 in Childers v. Floyd." In Childers, the State
argued that the defendant, a county commissioner, paid Willie Junior,
also a county commissioner, for the purpose of securing Junior's vote in
favor of Escambia County's (County) purchasing a local soccer complex
from Joe Elliott. In return, Elliott allegedly gave monetary kickbacks
to Childers and Junior after the County bought the property.7 2
After striking a plea bargain with the State, Junior provided evidence
about Childers's and Elliott's participation in the bribes and related
kickbacks. After Elliott was acquitted, Junior provided additional
details to his story. Among other things, Junior changed his initial
statement that there had only been an implicit understanding that he
and Childers would receive $100,000 in kickbacks; the new testimony
was that Childers had explicitly said there would be payments. The
State then moved to revoke Junior's plea agreement, arguing that the
new details showed that Junior had not testified truthfully in the Elliot
trial, but the trial court refused to grant the motion.7
At Childers's trial, the court refused to allow Childers's counsel to
cross-examine Junior about the State's attempt to revoke the plea
agreement for the purpose of probing Junior's bias or motive to embellish
his story "because, among other reasons, under [Florida's version of Rule
403], 'the prejudice would outweigh any probative value."'7 4 Instead,
the cross-examination covered the multiple, changing iterations of
Junior's testimony, leaving out the fact that the State believed its star
witness had been untruthful in his prior testimony." The jury
convicted Childers of bribery and unlawful compensation.
Childers sought habeas relief, contending that the trial court violated
his right to confront Junior by limiting "his cross-examination of Junior
solely to avoid 'unfair prejudice' to the State."7 The magistrate judge,
and later the district judge for the United States District Court for the

70. See generally United States v. Fernandez, 392 F. App'x 743, 745-47 (11th Cir. 2010)
(describing the business records rule and the requirement that a custodian authenticate
the record).
71. 608 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2010), reversed en banc 625 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2010).
72. Id. at 780.
73. Id. at 780-81.
74. Id. at 781-82.
75. Id. at 783, 793.
76. Id. at 787.
77. Id. at 788.
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Northern District of Florida, disagreed." After conducting a de novo
review of Childers's Confrontation Clause arguments (which had not
been raised in state court), the magistrate judge explained that the
testimony excluded at trial would not have affected the jury's impression
of Junior's credibility and therefore did not constitute a violation of the
Confrontation Clause.
On appeal Judge Barzilay, visiting from the United States Court of
International Trade, concluded that Childers was entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus.o Judge Barkett concurred." The Court reasoned that
the trial court impermissibly limited Childers's right to cross-examine
the State's star witness regarding Junior's perceptions as to how Elliott's
acquittal affected his plea bargain and how the notice to revoke his plea
agreement affected Junior's state of mind.82 The court noted that,
contrary to the assertions made by the dissent, the Confrontation Clause
violation was not coextensive with Florida Rule of Evidence 403.8
Instead, the court concluded that the limited nature of Childers's crossexamination of Junior stripped the questioning of context and prevented
the jury from hearing crucial information about why Junior changed his
testimony.& This limitation severely impaired Childers's efforts to
expose Junior's possible motivations for changing his previous testimony
to implicate Childers and violated Childers's constitutional rights."
Judge Tjoflat, in his dissent, argued that the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)86 insulated the trial
court's Rule 403 decisions to limit the cross-examination from federal
review.87 Because the ruling was, in Judge Tjoflat's opinion, a straightforward evidentiary decision by a trial court, there was no appropriate
federal claim for the court of appeals to consider." Judge Tjoflat
maintained that there could be no violation of the Confrontation Clause
if the trial court had not abused its discretion in excluding the evidence
under Florida Rule of Evidence 403: "it is clear that the Confrontation
Clause in the cross-examination context does not preclude the operation

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 779-80 & n.*.
81.
82.

Id. at 794 (Barkett, J., concurring).
Id. at 791-92 (majority opinion).

83.

Id. at 789 n.6; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2010).

84.
85.

Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.

86.
18, 22,
87.
88.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered section of 8,
28, & 42 U.S.C.).
Childers, 608 F.3d at 795 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id. at 808.
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of Florida 403 as written or the Florida practice of committing Florida
Accordingly, in the
403 rulings to the trial judge's discretion.""
exercise of discretion by a trial court, nothing about Rule 403 violates
the right of confrontation.o Other members of the Eleventh Circuit
apparently agreed with Judge Tjoflat: after a poll, the court voted to
rehear the case en banc." The en banc court concluded that there had
been no violation of the Sixth Amendment.92 "[Cilearly established law
says only that trial courts cannot bar all cross-examination into a
witness's possible biases.9 3 Judge Tjoflat, writing for the court and
echoing his dissent, explained that "Childers's attorneys were clearly
able to probe Junior's biases regarding the plea agreement . . . [and]

Childers's jury learned about Junior's motive to lie."' As such, the
court concluded that the state court's decision was not an unreasonable
application federal law. And, because the court did not confront "facts
that are materially indistinguishable from" Supreme Court precedents,
its decision was not contrary to clearly established federal caselaw."
Accordingly, the court of appeals changed course, and concluded that
Floyd was not entitled to habeas relief."
The court reached a less controversial conclusion on the Confrontation
Clause in United States v. Jones" (or at least a decision not requiring
full review by the Court sitting en banc). Deon Jones was indicted on
four counts of possessing a firearm and ammunition." The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia allowed the
prosecution to show the jury a video of an interrogation of Kelly Bigham
The video depicted Bigham "induring her testimony at trial."
form[ing] the detective that she had sold a .38 revolver to Mr. Jones....
[and] describling] how she and Mr. Jones drove to a nice area of town,
where Mr. Jones shot a white man." 00

89. Id. at 804.
90. Id.
91. See Childers, 625 F.3d at 1319-20 (ordering rehearing en banc).
92. Childers v. Floyd, No. 08-15590, slip op. at 48 (11th Cir. June 4, 2011).
93. See id. at 35-43 (outlining federal caselaw demonstrating that limitations on crossexamination are routinely upheld).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 55.
97. 601 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2010).
98. Id. at 1253.
99. Id. at 1261.
100. Id. at 1253.
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Jones objected to the showing of the videotape, contending that it was
hearsay and that it violated the Confrontation Clause.10 The district
court disagreed, deciding that the video was a past recollection recorded
and admissible under Rule 803(5),102 and there was no Sixth Amendment violation. During its deliberations, the jury requested a second
viewing of the video, which was granted, again over the defendant's
objection.'o The jury convicted Jones and he appealed.'O' The Eleventh Circuit divided its review of Jones's claims in two parts, addressing
first the Rule 803(5) argument and then the Confrontation Clause argument. 05
Rule 803(5) requires that the witness once had knowledge of a matter
but presently has insufficient memory "to testify fully and accurately.")06 When Bigham testified, she made several statements suggesting that "she lacked [a] 'clear and distinct recollection in [her] response
to the question[s]' regarding the subject matter of her interview with
[the d]etective."o' Bigham explained that she could not remember
crucial details, such as selling the defendant a firearm or the defendant
making any remarks about the gun. 0 8 After showing her the video,
the prosecutor asked if she recalled anything more, to which Bigham
replied, "I remember what was just said;" Bigham further "responded
The Eleventh
that she could recall 'some' of the relevant events."'
Circuit concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in
permitting the use of the video."o
The Eleventh Circuit went on to detail the manner in which a witness
authenticates past recollection."' The court explained that in addition
to a proper refreshing of memory, Rule 803(5) requires that "[tihe
witness must be able now to assert that the record accurately represented his knowledge and recollection at the time. The usual phrase

101. Id. at 1261.
102. FED. R. EVID. 803(5).
103. Jones, 601 F.3d at 1261.
104. Id. at 1254.
105. Id. at 1262-63.
106. FED. R. EvID. 803(5).
107. Jones, 601 F.3d at 1262 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting NLRB
v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp., 273 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1960)). All decisions handed
down by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
108. Jones, 601 F.3d at 1262.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1263.
111. Id. at 1262.
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requires the witness to affirm that he knew it to be true at the
time.""1 ' Although the prosecution's efforts to secure such a statement
from Bigham were "lackluster," they were enough to meet the standards
of Rule 803(5).x1a Bigham testified that it was easier for her to
remember her interaction with Jones when the video was made than
during the trial and that her statements in the video were true.u' At
the very least, Bigham indicated that the video was an accurate record
of her statements by saying "that's me talking [iun the video.""'
The court then turned to the defendant's claim that admission of
Bigham's videotaped statement violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause."' The court quickly dispatched his argument, "emphasiz[ing] that 'a primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause] is
the right of cross-examination.""' The Sixth Amendment's protection,
however, is only for "an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not
cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever
Cross-examination typically
extent, the defense might wish.""s
consists of placing a witness "on the stand, under oath, and [having the
witness] respond[] willingly to questions.""e
The court explained that Jones's Sixth Amendment right to confront
witnesses was not violated because Bigham was subject to unrestrained
cross-examination while present at trial. 20 Additionally, Bigham

112. Id. (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 448 n.1 (1963)).
113. Id. at 1263.
114. Id. at 1262. In her own words, "If that was what was said then, that's what I
remember then, what was just in the video." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Jones also asserted that the district court
erred by allowing the jury to view the video of Ms. Bigham a second time during their
deliberations. Id. at 1263-64. Jones argued that the second viewing was, in effect, an
admission of the video into evidence as an exhibit, and that Rule 803(5) forbids such
admissions. Id. at 1264; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(5) ("If admitted, the memorandum or
record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered
by an adverse party."). The court assumed that the viewing was error, but "this nonconstitutional error was . .. harmless." Jones, 601 F.3d at 1264. As with so many of its
evidentiary decisions, the Court determined that, "Jin light of all the evidence available
to the jury, we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially
swayed" nor were Jones's substantial rights affected. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
116. Jones, 601 F.3d at 1263.
117. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415,418 (1965)).
118. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id. (quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554,555 (1988)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
120. Id.
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answered Jones's questions while under oath and before a jury that was
able to analyze Bigham's credibility as to the statements on the video
and her testimony.121 The court explained that neither confirmation
nor specific guarantees of trustworthiness are required when a hearsay
declarant is exposed to unobstructed cross-examination and is present
at trial. 122 Furthermore, the constitutional requirements are met by
the jury's evaluation of the witness's behavior, the protections of crossexamination, and the oath.1 23
Although the Confrontation Clause was not addressed, the Eleventh
At first
Circuit dealt with hearsay in United States v. Belfast.12
glance, Belfast seems more like a law school final exam than an actual
case given the complicated legal questions it presents. The numerous
hearsay issues in Belfast, however, were more than an academic
exercise; the court affirmed a ninety-seven-year prison term for Roy
Belfast, the son of deposed Liberian autocrat Charles Taylor. 121 In
Judge Marcus's words, "[tihe facts of this case are riddled with
extraordinary cruelty and evil." 126
The defendant alleged that the Southern District of Florida abused its
discretion by admitting, pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1),' 27 several out-ofcourt hearsay statements by Kpadeh and Dulleh, two of his torture
victims, which explained Belfast's commission of the alleged acts. 128
Rule 801(d)(1) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [tihe
declarant testifies at . . . trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, . . the statement is consistent with the

declarant's testimony," and the statement "is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper
influence or motive." 29
The court determined that under both Rules 801(d)(1)(B) and
803(2)130 Dulleh's prior consistent statements were admissible. 31
The court noted that Dulleh's prior consistent statements had been used
to rebut Belfast's implication that Dulleh had the motive to fabri-

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988)).
611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 793.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(dXl).
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 816.
FED. R. EVID. 801(dXl).
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 817.
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cate.112 Dulleh's statements were thus admissible under Rule 801(d)
(1XB) because the statements were made before the alleged motive
arose.'
The court also established that Dulleh's prior consistent
statements, made four to five hours after he was assaulted, were
admissible as excited utterances under Rule 803(2),134 which permits
the admission of statements "relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by
the event or condition."3 3 Belfast argued that the time lapse was too
long, but the court held that the district court had not abused its
discretion in deciding that when Dulleh told other prisoners about the
torture he endured, the stress of excitement was still on him.'36
Belfast further alleged that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to admit, under Rule 803(4),"a1 parts of the victims'
medical records.'
Belfast first objected to Kpadeh's recorded statement that he was tortured and imprisoned for two months, which was
The court determined that this
given to a medical professional.'
statement was admissible under Rule 801(dX1XB) as a prior consistent
statement.140 Belfast next argued that it was an abuse of discretion
for the district court to refuse to redact terms such as "abuse" and
"torture" in the victims' medical records."'
The court observed,
however, that Rule 803(4) allows statements regarding medical
treatment and diagnosis to be admissible hearsay.'4 2
Belfast also argued that the district court abused its discretion by
admitting the testimony of one of his former soldiers.4 3 The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the testimony was admissible under Rule
801(d)(2XC)'" as an admission by a party-opponent.14 1 In particular,
the statements at issue concerned the same matter for which Belfast had
employed the soldier.'4 ' The testimony was therefore "a statement by

132.

Id.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 817-18.
135. FED. R. EVID. 803(2); see also Belfast, 611 F.3d at 817.
136. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 818.
137. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
138. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 818.
139. Id.
140. Id.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 818-19; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
143.
144.
145.
146.

Belfast, 611 F.3d at 820.
FED. R. EvID. 801(dX2)(C).
Belfast, 611 F.3d at 820.
Id.
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a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject" and admissible hearsay.14 1
Finally, Belfast posited that the admission of the testimony of a
United States Department of State official regarding the general political
environment of Liberia was an abuse of discretion by the district
court.' The Eleventh Circuit determined that under Rule 803(20),149
this testimony was admissible as hearsay regarding "the [rieputation in
a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events
of general history important to the community or State or nation in
The court further reasoned that this testimony was
which located."'
necessary to educate the jury."'1 Thus, despite an incredibly convoluted record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had not
abused its discretion in admitting the various out of court statements
used against Belfast and affirmed the conviction.'5 2
IV.

DAUBERT RELIABILITY

As was the case in previous versions of this Survey, the role of federal
courts as gatekeepers for expert testimony received significant attention
from the Eleventh Circuit in 2010. A brief review of the applicable
standard, as explained in Federal Rule of Evidence 702153 and Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,s provides some context.
Daubertmakes district judges "gatekeepers," charged with ensuring that
speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury."'
District courts must ensure that, whether based on professional studies
or personal experience, an expert's testimony utilizes the same level of
"intellectual rigor" used by experts in the field.156
Rule 702 governs the admission of expert testimony in federal court
and provides that expert testimony is admissible "if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of

147. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2XC).
148. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 821.
149. FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
150. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 821 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
151. Belfast, 611 F.3d at 821.
152. Id. at 820-21, 828.
153. FED. R. EVID. 702.
154. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
155. Id. at 597.
156. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
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reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case."
The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Rule 702 and Daubert as
permitting expert testimony that meets three requirements.5 ' First,
the expert must be qualified to competently testify concerning the matter
the expert plans to address." 9 Second, the methodology used by the
expert must be reliable as determined by a Daubert inquiry.6 o Third,
the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding the
evidence or determining issues of fact.1"'
The decision in Hendrix v. Evenflo Co.16 2 lays out the court's approach to Daubert reliability. Hendrix, the plaintiff, sued Evenflo Co.,
the defendant manufacturer of a child's car seat, after the device
allegedly malfunctioned during a car accident. The car seat became
dislodged when Hendrix's SUV was struck by another vehicle; her
fifteen-day-old son was injured in the crash. Although both parties
agreed that the child suffered a closed-head injury, they disputed its
severity. By the time the child was eighteen months old, he began to
exhibit signs of developmental disorders and was eventually diagnosed
with autism-spectrum disorder (ASD). His physician, Dr. Suhrbier, also
discovered a cyst-called a syringomyelia-on the child's spinal cord.'63
Hendrix's experts, Dr. Suhrbier and Dr. Hoffman, concluded that the
child's ASD and the syringomyelia were caused by injuries he sustained
in the accident. Evenflo moved to exclude any testimony from Dr.
Suhrbier or Dr. Hoffman, asserting that there was no reliable scientific
basis for the experts' opinions.'" The Northern District of Florida
agreed that Hendrix's experts could not demonstrate a reliable basis for
their conclusion that the accident had caused the child's ASD and
granted partial summary judgment to Evenflo on that issue.'6 ' The
district court, however, ruled that it would permit the experts' testimony
with respect to the cause of the syringomyelia. Instead of proceeding to
litigate liability with regard to the cause of the syringomyelia injury,
Hendrix opted to dismiss with prejudice and appealed the district court's
Daubert ruling on her experts' opinions as to the cause of the ASD.166

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

FED. R. EVID. 702.
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
609 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1186-88.
Id. at 1188.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1190-91.
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On appeal the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court had
not abused its discretion."'
The court conducted a step-by-step
explanation of how and when expert testimony can be admitted, as well
as how a district court should frame its inquiries.168 Hendrix argued
that the district court had preliminarily made the wrong inquiry.'69
Specifically, Hendrix suggested that the district court should not have
asked the experts if they established whether ASD can be caused by
traumatic brain injury. Instead, the inquiry should have included
whether the particular neurologic deficits that led to the ASD diagnosis
could have resulted from traumatic brain injury.xo Hendrix asserted
that such an inquiry was necessary because ASD was recognized and
diagnosed based on its underlying impairments."' When the Eleventh
Circuit examined the record below to determine precisely what the
experts' opinions were, the court discerned that while both Dr. Surhbier
and Dr. Hoffman had referred to the child's underlying impairments, the
doctors opined only that the trauma was responsible for causing his ASD
taken as a whole.'7 2 Consequently, the court held that Hendrix failed
to actually bring this issue before the district court."7 3
The court then turned its attention to the reliability of Hendrix's
experts' opinions and explained that courts can only admit scientific
evidence in its present state due to resources, time, and information. "
Courts are advised not to admit inference, conjecture, or speculation,
that sound scientific principles cannot support.'
Citing Daubert and
Eleventh Circuit precedent, the court noted that absent sufficient
underlying evidence, the court may "conclude that there is simply too
great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered" and
reject profferred testimony. 7 6
Hendrix's experts relied on "differential etiology" to reach their
conclusions, which is a method that eliminates unlikely or impossible

167. Id. at 1203.
168. Id. at 1193-95, 1202-03.
169. Id. at 1191.
170. Id. at 1191-92.
171. Id. at 1192.
172. Id. at 1192-93.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1193-94 (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2002)).
175. Id. at 1194 (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.
2002)).
176. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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causes of a disease or disorder to determine the most likely cause.'77
The Court has previously acknowledged that the differential etiology
method can establish a sound basis for opinions of medical causation
when used under reliable circumstances. 7 ' Even so, the court delved
into the evidence presented to the district court and pointed out that
differential etiologies require experts to engage in the following two-step
process: (1) "compil[ing] a comprehensive list of hypotheses that might
explain the set of salient clinical findings under consideration," meaning
that the expert must demonstrate general causation, and (2) ruling out
all causes but one or showing specific causation. 7 '
The court concluded that neither expert could provide reliable proof of
general causation.'s" For example, "Dr. Hoffman failled] to show how,
by scientifically valid methodology, traumatic brain injury could ever be
a possible cause of autism in anyone."' 8 ' Dr. Hoffman relied on
medical textbooks and epidemiological studies to demonstrate that brain
trauma can cause ASD."2 2 Rather than examining each of the sources
relied upon in the district court, the Eleventh Circuit focused on the
medical studies Hendrix emphasized on appeal." In examining those
sources, the court did not find a single instance where the literature
demonstrated a causal link between trauma and ASD. 1" Without this
connection in any of his sources, Dr. Hoffman could not show a reliable
basis for "ruling-in" brain trauma as a cause of ASD and thereby failed
to show general causation.'" Because Dr. Hoffman had not ruled-in
brain trauma as a cause of ASD, the court had no need to discuss his

177. Id. at 1194-95.
178. Id. at 1195.
179. Id. at 1195, 1197 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180. See id. at 1201, 1203.
181. Id. at 1198 (alteration in original) (quoting Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., 255 F.R.D. 568,
598 (N.D. Fla. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1199.
184. See id. at 1199-1202. For instance, the court examined an article cited by Dr.
Hoffman that discussed traumatic brain injury in children. Id. at 1200. Although the
article associated trauma with neurologic impairments, it drew an important distinction
between inflicted trauma (such as "shaken baby syndrome") and unintentional trauma
(such as the car accident at issue in Hendrix). Id. The article explained that while one
child in that study did develop ASD after suffering trauma, the child also "had significant
exposure to alcohol in utero." Id. Another of Dr. Hoffman's sources, a textbook, did not
link traumatic brain injuries to ASD but instead only "provide[dl some support for the idea
that even minor injuries sustained by newborn brains can result in more severe neurologic
impairments than one would expect from the initial extent of the injury." Id. at 1201.
185. Id. at 1201.
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attempts at specific causation and determined that the district court had
not abused its discretion in excluding his testimony."a
Dr. Suhrbier's evidence was even less reliable than Dr. Hoffman's
because Dr. Suhrbier failed to provide evidence to establish general
causation between ASD and traumatic brain injury.8 7 In the light of
these unsubstantiated assertions, the court found no difficulty in
affirming the district court's conclusion that the experts' opinions were
unreliable under Daubert.1"
Hendrix is instructive for several reasons. First, the case demonstrates the extent to which federal courts are obliged to assess the
scientific basis for expert testimony, even to the point of federal judges
developing some expertise themselves.8 ' The case also illustrates that
novel or unsubstantiated theories (like trauma-induced ASD) are not fit
for federal courts: "The courtroom is not the place for scientific guesswork, even of the inspired sort. Law lags science; it does not lead
it."'9o Second, the court's opinion shows that unless experts performing differential diagnoses can show both general and specific causation
supported by reliable medical literature, their testimony is little more
than unfounded conjecture and is therefore rightly excluded.'
Finally, the Hendrix decision directs district courts to be vigorous in
ascertaining reliability, urging them to remember that "[mlerely
demonstrating that an expert has experience .. . does not automatically
render every opinion and statement by that expert reliable.""'
In Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc.,"sa just a few weeks after issuing the
opinion in Hendrix, the court once again offered an extensive explanation
of Daubert reliability. Kilpatrick was a products liability case, centered
on a pain pump manufactured by Breg, Inc., the defendent, which
released a steady stream of anesthetic directly into a targeted area of
the body-the shoulder in the plaintiff Kilpatrick's case. Kilpatrick's sole
expert, Dr. Poehling, testified that the use of Breg's pain pump caused
glenohumeral chondrolysis-the dissolution of cartilage-in Kilpatrick's
shoulder joint. Breg moved to exclude Dr. Poehling's testimony and for
summary judgment on the grounds that Kilpatrick failed to prove both

186. Id. at 1202.
187. Id. at 1203.
188. Id.
189. See id. at 1199-1201 (discussing scientific literature on head trauma and its
physiological effects on the brain).
190. Id. at 1203 (quoting Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir.
2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. See id. at 1195, 1201.
192. Id.
193. 613 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2010).
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general and specific causation. The Southern District of Florida agreed,
excluded Dr. Poehling's testimony, and entered judgment in favor of
Breg.194
On appeal, Kilpatrick argued that because Dr. Poehling's methodsreviewing the "differential diagnosis" methodology and medical
literature-used to reach his determinations were not new or novel, the
district court should not have assessed the reliability of Dr. Poehling's
methods, the district court should have only focused on whether Dr.
Poehling was qualified to give expert testimony."1s The Eleventh
Circuit flatly rejected this argument, stating that "[sluch an approach
goes against the law of this Circuit, which has reversed trial courts who
abdicate their gatekeeper role and refuse to assess reliability.""'
Instead, the court explained that it was necessary and entirely proper
for the district court to scrutinize Dr. Poehling's methods and the
reliability of his sources."' To hold differently would induce courts to
"rubber stamp the opinions of expert witnesses," after the witness is
proven an expert.s9 8
The court then itself examined the reliability of the medical literature
and differential diagnosis methodology Dr. Poehling used to arrive at his
conclusions.' 9 As the court explained in Hendrix, differential diagnoses require an expert to demonstrate a causal chain between an injury
or event and the alleged injury in a given case, both in terms of general
and specific causation.o
Upon reviewing the literature, the Eleventh Circuit, like the district
court, determined that it was neither extensive nor corroborative enough
to render reliable Dr. Poehling's conclusion that the use of pain pumps
can cause glenohumeral chondrolysis generally.2 0 ' Dr. Poehling had
conducted no tests himself, none of the articles he relied upon were
based on epidemiological studies, only one of the articles was a
comparative study that included patients who had undergone surgery
similar to Kilpatrick's, and no article reached a conclusion as to the
general cause of glenohumeral chondrolysis.20 ' The court emphasized

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 1333-34.
Id. at 1336.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1337-40.
609 F.3d at 1189.
Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1337.
Id. at 1336-37.
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that the lack of testing and corroborative epidemiological tests made
establishing general causation more difficult but not fatal.20 3
After further examination of each of the studies upon which Dr.
Poehling relied, the court observed that the studies lacked "statistical
context," were valuable only for studying injuries in rabbits, or were
The court also specifically noted that none of the
inconclusive."
articles took into account the background risk for glenohumeral
chondrolysis, finding that Dr. Poehling's failure to consider this factor
"placed the reliability of [his] conclusions in further doubt."205
The court also examined the reliability of Dr. Poehling's specific
causation conclusion that Berg's pain pump had caused Kilpatrick's
chondrolysis.20 6 The court stated that "Dr. Poehling could point to
nothing other than the ... temporal relationship between Kilpatrick's

initial surgery and his chondrolysis" and that "[sluch specific causation
testimony has been found to be inherently unreliable in this Circuit."207 Instead, the court explained that an expert conducting a
differential diagnosis must compile a comprehensive list of all possible
causes of the disease at issue and then systematically and scientifically
rule out causes until only one suspected cause remains. 208 Because Dr.
Poehling testified "he could not explain why potentially unknown, or
idiopathic alternative causes were not ruled out" and because he
"admitted that neither he nor anyone else in the medical community
'understands the physiological process by which [chondrolysis] develops
and what factors cause the process to occur,'" the court found that "the
key foundation for applying differential diagnosis was missing."209
Given the total lack of evidence supporting a causal link between the
pain pump and destruction of cartilage generally or specifically in
Kilpatrick's case, the court concluded that there was no abuse of
discretion and affirmed.210
The court concluded by noting the relatively restrictive nature of its
Daubertreliability jurisprudence and by emphasizing the importance of
the abuse of discretion standard. 1 ' As the court explained, "We are

203. Id.
204. Id. at 1337-40.
205. Id. at 1342.
206. Id. at 1342-43.
207. Id. at 1342.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1343 (alteration in original).
210. Id. The court noted that meeting the burden of proving general and specific
causation required the use of expert testimony. Id. at 1334 n.4.
211. Id. at 1341, 1343-44 (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2005)) ("'[Tlhe heavy thumb-really a thumb and a finger or two-that is put on the
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aware that courts in other circuits have taken a more expansive
approach and permitted expert testimony in similar situations. 2 12
Regardless of what other courts consider appropriate, Hendrix and
Kilpatrick demonstrate that the Eleventh Circuit is exacting when it
comes to reliable scientific opinions and that the strong deference to
district judges as Daubert gatekeepers is not easily overcome.

district court's side of the scale,' the court concludes that it was not an abuse of discretion
to exclude the expert opinion of Dr. Poehling in this case.").
212. Id. at 1343.
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